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T h e p r o b l e m of pro~.ecting m o b i l e code f r o m malicious h o s t s is a n i m p o r t a n t security issue, for w h i c h m a n y solutions h a v e b e e n proposed. W e describe a m e t h o d to a d a p t an existing technique, e x e c u t i o n tracing, to e n h a n c e its flexibility in d e p l o y m e n t for a large scale m o b i l e a g e n t system.
T h i s is achieved t h r o u g h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a t r u s t e d t h i r d party, t h e verification server, w h i c h u n d e r t a k e s t h e verification of e x e c u t i o n t r a c e s o n b e h a l f of t h e p l a t f o r m l a u n c h i n g t h e agent. T h e server c o n s t r u c t s a certificate t h a t testifies to t h e c a p a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r h o s t p l a t f o r m to u n d e r t a k e t h e correct e x e c u t i o n of a m o b i l e agent. I n this sense, t h e server a s s u m e s a role ~malogous of a Certificate A u t h o r i t y (CA) in a P K I . W e briefly discuss t h e issues associated w i t h s u c h a framework.

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N
Mobile agents h a v e b e c o m e p o p u l a r in r e c e n t years, being viewed as a n e w p a r a d i g m for d i s t r i b u t e d c o m p u t at i o n t h a t offers a m o r e flexible ~[ t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l cllent-server c o m p u t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t s . Several ~dvamtages have b e e n identified [15] for utilizing m o b i l e agents in a dist r i b u t e d e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e r e h a s also b e e n several application areas p r o p o s e d for t h e wide scale d e p l o y m e n t of m o b i l e agents, t h e m o s t n o t a b l e b e i n g electronic c o m m e r c e [9] , [6] . I n such a n area, security b e c o m e s a p a r a m o u n t issue as fin a n c i a l c o n t r a c t s m a y b e n e g o t i a t e d b y t h e m o b i l e a g e n t w i t h o u t direct user i n t e r v e n t i o n .
A c o n c e p t u a l discussion of t h e security c o n c e r n s of m o b i l e code is p r o v i d e d in [4] . In general, t h e two m a i n areas of cons i d e r a t i o n are host security a n d code security.
Host security involves p r o t e c t i n g t h e h o s t p l a t f o r m f r o m malicious agents t h a t m a y a t t e m p t to gain u n a u t h o r i z e d access to local re-
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SAC 2002, Madrid, Spain @2002 ACM 1-58113-445-2/02/03 ... $5.00 sources or i n i t i a t e malicious actions o n t h e p l a t f o r m . C o d e s e c u r i t y is t h e e x a c t reverse a n d aims to p r o t e c t t h e m o b i l e a g e n t f r o m a m a l i c i o u s host p l a t f o r m t h a t m a y a t t e m p t to s u b v e r t its correct o p e r a t i o n or m m a i p u l a t e sensitive d a t a c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n .
Host security is a r e a s o n a b l y well r e s e a r c h e d issue, a n d memy v i a b l e m e c h a n i s m s h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d to a d d r e s s it. Exa m p l e s of such m e c h a n i s m s include s a n d b o x s e c u r i t y (used in Jav-a. to p r o v i d e access control) (8] , s a f e -t y p e d l a n g u a g e s [20] a n d p r o o f -c a r r y i n g code [16] . C o d e security is however m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c , since t h i s aspect h a s only c o m e into p r o m i n e n c e r e c e n t l y as a security p r o b l e m u n i q u e to m obile code. S o m e of t h e m o r e well k n o w n m e c h a n i s m s u s e d to overcome t h i s p r o b l e m i n c l u d e code o b f u s c a t i o n [10], enc r y p t e d f u n c t i o n s [17] , e x e c u t i o n t r a c i n g [19] emd t a m p e r r e s i s t a n t h a r d w a r e [21] , [23] . It is likely t h i s area will b e crucial in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e f u t u r e viability of m o b i l e a g e n t a p p l i c a t i o n in e -c o m m e r c e scenarios. A n overview of t h e c u r r e n t t e c h n i q u e s available t o address b o t h host axtd code security is p r o v i d e d in [12] a n d [22] ; t h e r e a d e r is r e f e r r e d to t h e m for a s u m m a r y of these t e c h n i q u e s as well as a discussion of their c o r r e s p o n d i n g a d v a n t a g e s a n d d r a w b a c k s .
T h e m a j o r i t y of t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s were designed as s t a n dedone solutions to b e deployed i n d e p e n d e n t l y of e x i s t i n g sec u r i t y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s for large scale e n v i r o n m e n t s , s u c h as a P u b l i c K e y I n f r a s t r u c t u r e ( P K I ) [I] . I n t e g r a t i o n of a techn i q u e w i t h i n a P K I would greatly ease its i n c o r p o r a t i o n into a security f r a m e w o r k for a real-world m o b i l e a g e n t applicat i o n scensxio ( s u c h as e -c o m m e r c e ) . T h e m a i n r e a s o n u n d e rlying t h e lack of a t t e m p t s at s u c h a n i n t e g r a t i o n is b e c a u s e a P K I is p r i m a r i l y designed t o a d d r e s s t h e issue of d i s t r i b u t e d a u t h e n t i c a t i o n . T h i s m a y b e useful for host s e c u r i t y b y verifying t h e i d e n t i t y o( a n a g e n t or its deployer, b u t it is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s h o w a u t h e n t i c a t i o n c a n aid in t h e prot e c t i o n of m o b i l e code.
I n this p a p e r , we m a k e a n a r g u m e n t for t h e inclusion of t r u s t as a n explicit c o m p o n e n t of a security f r a m e w o r k for m o b i l e code. I n t h e c o n t e x t of our work, we a d o p t t h e p o pular definition of t r u s t [3] as a n e c e s s a r y c o u n t e r p a r t to t h e delegation of tasks a n d / o r responsibilities in an a g e n t syst e m . A s y s t e m i n v o l v i n g t h e use of t r u s t (such as a P K I ) usually includes a t r u s t m o d e l t h a t formally describes h o w t r u s t is maaxipulated a n d p r o p a g a t e d in t h a t s y s t e m . Inc o r p o r a t i n g t r u s t in a code s e c u r i t y t e c h n i q u e p e r m i t s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of s u c h a t r u s t model, w h i c h will b e useful for i n d e p t h analysis on the integration process w i t h a PKI. We present execution tracing as a code security technique suitable for establishing t r u s t levels (i.e. q u a n t i t a t i v e measure of t r u s t ) in such a framework. W e t h e n show how this technique can be e x t e n d e d so t h a t it incorporates a t r u s t e d t h i r d p a r t y t h a t utilizes certificates t h a t are d i s t r i b u t e d a n d m a naged within the context of a PKI. O u r main contributions are thus:
• Arguing for t r u s t as a necessary c o m p o n e n t in a framework to address mobile code security a n d the use of the execution tracing technique to establish levels of trust in such a framework.
• Describing an approach for e x t e n d i n g t h e execution tracing technique so t h a t it can be i n t e g r a t e d into P K I via t h e supplementaJ use of certificates.
In Section 2, we explain hew utilizing trust in a code security framework is useful in certain situations. Execution tracing is t h e n described briefly emd its use in establishing trust levels in such a framework is justified. Section 3 outlines the main entities involved in a security framework t h a t involves an e x t e n d e d version of t h e original execution tracing technique. T h e operations of t h e various entities in this framework is traced in Section 4. Section 5 discusses related work involving certificate use with agents, a n d Section 6 concludes with a s u m m a r y a n d a discussion of future work.
TRUST IN A C O D E S E C U R I T Y F R A M E -W O R K
In a previous p a p e r [18] , we proposed t h e use of trust as an i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t in t h e development of a framework for mobile agent code security. We briefly s u m m a r i z e t h e two original propositions for employing trust in a mobile agent security framework: A large portion of the techniques developed so far have been found to be deficient in one or more aspects u p o n closer scrutiny. It is likely t h a t a future security infrastructure t h a t addresses the code security issue comprehensively will need to incorporate a combin a t i o n of techniques. T h e level of t r u s t in a particular execution e n v i r o n m e n t can be used as a basis for the appropriate combination of techniques to apply in t h a t environment. T r u s t p e r m i t s m o r e f l e x i b l e d e p l o y m e n t o f a c o d e sec u r i t y t e c h n i q u e . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t consideration in the deployment of a security technique is t h e overhead incurred w h e n using it. For example, executing obfuscated code could r e s u l t in a performance lag (as contrasted to n o r m a l code) t h a t m i g h t become intolerable in certain applications. For an agent with a predefmed itinerary r u n n i n g on a t r u s t e d platform, we could apply obfuscation to selected portions of its code a n d state t h a t are critical to its correct functioning, while a n agent r u n n i n g on an u n t r u s t e d platform would have its entire code obfuscated.
Using execution tracing to establish trust
In general, literature surveys [12] , [14] , [22] on the variety of code security techniques available have classified t h e m into techniques t h a t prevent meaningful t a m p e r i n g a n d techniques t h a t detec~ such tampering. Techniques such as code obfuscation a n d encrypted functions are designed to prevent meemingful m a n i p u l a t i o n of the agent code (i.e. m a n i p ulation in a m a n n e r where t h e effects of t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n are k n o w n or predictable to t h e m a n i p u l a t o r a n d which will eventually lead to the p r o c u r e m e n t of some advantage to the m a n i p u l a t o r ) a n d are correspondingly more complicated in t h e i r deployment. However should such m a n i p u l a t i o n occur, there is no provision to detect it emd underta&e punitive measures on t h e trespassing host platform. In effect, t h e t r u s t model is very simplistic here; no entity is t r u s t e d at all a n d m a x i m a l measures are u n d e r t a k e n to p r e v e n t any possible security breach.
Techniques t h a t detect t a m p e r i n g , such as execution tracing, allow the development of a more complex t r u s t model. By allowing a host platform to execute a n agent emd t h e n checking the results of the execution, it becomes possible to identify the different levels of t r u s t t h a t can be established in t h a t host platform t h r o u g h suitable m a t h e m a t i c a l or intuitive analysis of the results (for example, considering the a m o u n t of correct executions as c o n t r a s t e d against incorrect ones). These different levels of trust can t h e n be used to select a c o m b i n a t i o n of code security techniques (in addition to execution tracing) t h a t need to be applied on t h a t particular host platform, in line with t h e original motivations for t h e use of t r u s t in a code security framework.
W i t h regards to this, we will employ execution tracing as our core code security technique in the framework t h a t we are a b o u t to develop ~md we describe how some of t h e original drawbacks of execution tracing c a n be overcome in our approach. T h e r e are other detection m e c h a n i s m s available such as forward integrity [23] a n d state appraisal [7] ; execution tracing however offers t h e i m p o r t a n t advantage of being able to detect t a m p e r i n g of any p a r t of t h e agent t h a t is actually executed as opposed to only specific portions, as is t h e case w i t h the former two m e c h a n i s m s [22] .
Execution tracing
In execution tracing, a host platform executing an agent ereates a trace of an agent's execution t h a t contains precisely t h e lines of code t h a t were executed by t h e mobile agent as well as all the external values t h a t were read by the mobile agent. W h e n t h e mobile agent requests to move, a ha~h of this trace a n d of the agent's i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e are signed by the host platform. This guarantees n o n -r e p u d i a t i o n by pror i d i n g evidence t h a t a specific state of execution (along with its corresponding results) was achieved on t h e host p l a t f o r m prior to migration. T h e trace is t h e n forwarded together with t h e actual mobile agent to t h e next host platform on t h e mobile agentJs itinerary. T h e new host platform will store this trace together with t h e new trace it creates when executing the mobile agent. U p o n r e t u r n of t h e mobile agent, t h e agent owner m a y (if s h e / h e suspects t h a t t h e mobile agent was not correctly executed) request t h e complete trace of t h e agent's execution c o m m e n c i n g from the first host platform. T h e agent owner will t h e n simulate the execution of the mobile agent based on t h e information contained in t h e trace. This simulation will result in an i n t e r m e d i a t e state a n d identify t h e next host
o r m t h e h a s h of t h e t r a c e a n d of t h e a g e n t ' s i n t e r m e d i a t e result, b o t h s i g n e d b y t h e first host p l a t f o r m . If t h e s e h a s h e s c o r r e s p o n d w i t h t h e t r a c e received f r o m t h e first h o s t p l a t f o r m a n d t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s t a t e of t h e s i m u l a t e d execution, t h e a g e n t owner k n o w s t h a t t h e first h o s t p l a t f o r m u n d e r t o o k a correct e x e c u t i o n of t h e agent. T h i s p r o c e s s is r e p e a t e d u n t i l t h e last h o s t p l a t f o r m t h a t t h e a g e n t m i g r a t e d to
. If at s o m e p o i n t a d i s c r e p a n c y is f o u n d d u r i n g t h e verification of t h e t r a c e p r o v i d e d b y a p a r t i c u l a r h o s t p l a t f o r m , t h e n a malicious h o s t h a s b e e n det e c t e d . T h e r e h a v e b e e n s o m e criticisms of this a p p r o a c h . T h e m a i n d r a w b a c k s are t h e size a n d n u m b e r of logs t o b e r e t a i n e d , a n d t h e fact t h a t t h e d e t e c t i o n process is t r i g g e r e d only o n suspicion t h a t a n a g e n t h a s b e e n m a n i p u l a t e d . O t h e r p r o blems i n c l u d e t h e difficulty of t r a c i n g t h e e x e c u t i o n r e s u l t s of m u l t i -t h r e a d e d agents.
C O M P O N E N T S OF THE M O B I L E C O D E S E C U R I T Y F R A M E W O R K
m e n t . I n t e g r a t i o n of t h e f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n a P K I w o u l d t h u s simplify its a c t u a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n for a real-world m o b i l e a g e n t a p p l i c a t i o n scenario.
Agent templates
A r i d o r a n d L a r g e [2] h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h e use of a g e n t design p a t t e r n s to simplify t h e process of c o n s t r u c t i n g a m o b i l e a g e n t for specific applications. A n a g e n t d e v e l o p e r c a n t h u s select f r o m a ' s t a n d a r d l i b r a r y ' i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s of t h e s e p a t t e r n s a n d c o m b i n e m u l t i p l e p a t t e r n s to c o m p o s e a c o mplete m o b i l e agent. A possible f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of m obike a g e n t t e m p l a t e s w o u l d involve refining these s t a n d a r d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s t o fit t h e specific r e q u i r e m e n t s of a m o b i l e a g e n t application, s u c h as typical e -c o m m e r c e scenarios des c r i b e d in [9] . I n s u c h a n i n s t a n c e , t h e t e m p l a t e n e e d only b e i u s t a n t i a t e d w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y p a r a m e t e r s (such as t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e agent, its t r a v e l itinerary, t h e p r o d u c t to b e p u r c h a s e d or i n q u i r e d after, etc) a n d it could t h e n b e deployed i m m e d i a t e l y .
Entities in the f r a m e w o r k
In o u r f r a m e w o r k , t h e following entities c a n b e defined a n d are d e s c r i b e d below.
Certificate authority (CA)
T h e C A in o u r e n v i r o n m e n t c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e C A in a P K I , w i t h similar roles a n d responsibilities. It will issue t h e n e c e s s a r y certificates to t h e o t h e r entities in t h e f r a m e w o r k a n d u n d e r t a k e o t h e r n e c e s s a r y key m a n a g e m e n t activities.
Agent owner platforra T h e a g e n t o w n e r p l a t f o r m is t h e o r i g i n a t i n g p l a t f o r m f r o m w h i c h a m o b i l e a g e n t is initially l a u n c h e d from i n t o a network of p l a t f o r m s . T h i s a g e n t could h a v e b e e n c o m p o s e d h e r e or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , a s s e m b l e d b y a code p r o d u c e r (a t h i r d p a r t y t h a t assembles a w o r k i n g m o b i l e a g e n t from t e m p l a t e s t h a t c a n b e i n s t a n t i a t e d l a t e r b y t h e a g e n t o w n e r p l a t f o r m )
elsewhere a n d t h e n t r a n s p o r t e d to t h e o w n e r p l a t f o r m in a s e c u r e m a n n e r . In a n y case, t h e a g e n t o w n e r p l a t f o r m is ass u m e d to b e a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e h u m a n / o r g a n i z a t i o n a l deployer of t h e agent.
Host platform
T h i s refers to t h e e x e c u t i o n e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t t h e m o b i l e a g e n t o p e r a t e s in once it m i g r a t e s away f r o m its o w n e r p l a tform. E a c h h o s t p l a t f o r m wll] b e c a p a b l e of h o s t i n g m o r e t h a n a n agent a n d will be c a p a b l e of p r o v i d i n g t h e necess a r y resources for safe i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n m n l t i p l e executing agents. A n a g e n t owner p l a t f o r m c a n also b e a h o s t p l a tf o r m for o t h e r a g e n t s l a u n c h e d f r o m different a g e n t o w n e r p l a t f o r m s , if t h i s is required.
Verification server T h e verification server is a t r u s t e d t h i r d p a r t y t h a t u n d e rt a k e s t h e verification of e x e c u t i o n t r a c e s s u b m i t t e d b y h o s t p l a t f o r m s o n b e h a l f of t h e a g e n t o w n e r p l a t f o r m . It functions as a s e c o n d level C A b y issuing c a p a b i l i t y certificates to host p l a t f o r m s t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e c a p a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r h o s t p l a t f o r m in e x e c u t i n g specific m o b i l e a g e n t t e m p l a t e s
correctly.
Capability certificates T h e s e are certificates t h a t associate t h e i d e n t i t y of a h o s t p l a t f o r m w i t h its c a p a b i l i t y of c o r r e c t l y e x e c u t i n g (i.e. exec u t i n g i n a n o n -m a l i c i o u s m a n n e r ) specific a g e n t t e m p l a t e s , as r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e i r identifiers. T h e p r i m a r y d i~e r e n c e b e t w e e n a c a p a b i l i t y certificate a n d a n o r m a l certificate is t h a t t h e p u b l i c key n o r m a l l y p r e s e n t is r e p l a c e d in t h e cap a b i l i t y certificate b y a t e m p l a t e identifier, w h i c h identifies t h e specific i n s t a n t l a t e d m o b i l e a g e n t t e m p l a t e t h a t c a n b e e x e c u t e d safely b y t h e h o s t p l a t f o r m c o n c e r n e d . T h e certificates are s i g n e d w i t h t h e p r i v a t e key of t h e r e s p e c t i v e
verification server a n d c a n b e verified u s i n g t h e p u b l i c key of t h e server, which is d i s t r i b u t e d s e p a r a t e l y in a n o r m a l certificate (issued b y t h e C A ) t o i n t e r e s t e d parties.
A l t h o u g h a verification server is c a p a b l e of t r a c i n g t h e exec u t i o n of a n y a g e n t t e m p l a t e , identifiers serve two i m p o r t a n t p u r p o s e s :
• It allows verification to b e m a t c h e d to resources available. Different a g e n t t e m p l a t e s (as specified b y their t e m p l a t e identifiers) possess dll~erent sizes a n d levels of c o m p l e
x i t y in t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r f u n c t i o n a lity. T h e a m o u n t of t i m e a n d resources to verify t h e i r e x e c u t i o n will c o r r e s p o n d closely to t h e s e 5~ctors as well. O p e r a t o r s of t h e verification servers c a n t h u s m a k e decisions o n w h i c h a g e n t t y p e s t h e y are willing to verify o n t h e basis of resources allocation policies a t their r e s p e c t i v e servers.
according to agent type; higher penalties would be incurred if the agent in question was meant to engage in a financial transaction then if it were not. Operators can again select which liabilities they are willing to risk on their respective verification servers.
Execution certificates
In addition to capability certificates, execution certificates are used to identify the success of such a validation process and are prepared and submitted by a verification server to a host platform upon successful completion of the validation process. Each execution certificate contains a hash of the agent code and state, a timestamp, the identity of the verification server that examined the trace, the identity of the host platform that undertook the execution of the mobile agent as well as the results of validating that trace. Each execution certificate is signed with the private key of the verification server and is validated in the same manner as the capability certificates.
7 Capability certificate revocation list
This list is analogous to the standard certificate revocation list (CRL) found in a PKI, and is used to invalidate previously issued capability certificates in the instance of an invalid execution trace being detected by a verification server. Each entry in this list is submitted by a verification server and will include the identity of the server and the host platform, the fault detected in the trace and a timestamp. An agent can choose to inspect this list prior to migrating to a new platform.
Changes in the execution tracing protocol
The primary difference between the original execution tracing protocol and the way it is employed in this fraanework is that the agent owner platform is no longer responsible for verifying the traces submitted by host platforms. Instead a new entity, the verification aerver undertakes this activity on behalf of the agent owner. Based on the results of this trace verification, the verification server will issue certificates to host platforms to indicate their capability of executing mobile agents in a valid manner. These certificates axe then distributed onwards to owner platforms with mobile agents that wish to migrate to these host platforms. The agents will then decide on the basis of the information in the certificates, whether it is safe or not to migrate to the respective host platforms on their given itinerary. There will be a large number of verification servers distributed throughout the system, capable of verifying the traces of every single agent executing on all the host platforms in the system.
4.
OPERATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the operations of the framework with reference to Fig. 1 by following the trail of a mobile agent as it migrates through the network.
Before migrating to a new host platform
Mobile agents will need to engage in a preliminary interaction with their intended target host platform prior to migrating there from their current h~st platform (or owner platform). Each agent will have a list of template identifier(s) representing the actual template(s) that they axe composed from. This, along with the immutable code portion of the agent, is signed by the agent owner platform to prevent tampering at other host platforms. The identifiers are submitted to the host platform that the mobile agent intends to migrate to (Fig. 1 a) .
The host platform receiving the identifiers then checks to see whether it possesses any capability certificates that contaln some or all of the identifiers specified. These axe then submitted back to the mobile agent, who can then make the decision to migrate or not (Fig. 1 b) . As a safety check, the agent may in addition consult the capability certificate revocation list to ascertain whether any of the capability certificates received have been invalidated. If the agent is not satisfied regarding the safety of its intended destination, it will select another host platform either dynmmically or proceed to the next destination on a predefined itinerary.
Migration to and execution on the new host platform
Once a decision is made, the mobile agent migrates over to its intended destination ( Fig. 1 d) , where execution commences and an execution trace is prepared by the host platform. This trace is submitted to the same verification server (Fig. 1 e) , who can validate it accordingly. If this trace verifies properly, an execution certificate is prepared and submitted back to the host platform (Fig. I f) . A copy of this certificate is stored locally at the host platform and the original is dispatched along with the mobile agent to the next platform ( Fig. 1 g) . The execution certificate is necessary to ensure acceptance of the mobile agent by the next platform.
If there is a deviation in the trace, which suggests the possibility of malicious tampering, no certificate is issued and instead an entry is updated by the verification server in the capability certificate revocation list to invalidate any previously issued capability certificates. This entry is only applicable for certificates issued by that verification server; it may not invalidate capability certificates issued by other verification servers.
Periodical checking of traces
Although execution traces are submitted to a specific verification server from a host platform every time an agent is executed on that platform, these traces need not be checked all the time. The idea is to rely on the established trust between the host platform and the verification server as well as the implicit understanding on part of the host platform that violation of this trust relationshipj if detected, will entail a greater economic loss (through appropriate sanctions) as contrasted to the possible gain that might be obtained through an tmdetected violation. In this way, the overhead on each verification server involved in checking every single execution trace can be reduced.
Necessity of execution certificate at receiving host platform
The reception of the execution certificate is compulsory for the new host platform to accept and execute the mobile agent. If such a certificate is not forthcoming within a predefined time limit, a communication failure or malicious tampering is assumed and the mobile agent is discarded firom the new platform it has just migrated to. This provides an important aspect of safeguarding the host platform fi~3m mobile agents that may have now become potentially dar_gerous due to possible subversion fxom the previous platform.
Safeguarding against malicious verification servers
To safeguard against the possibility of a malicious verification server (i.e. a verification server that intentionally maligns the host platform by adding invalid entries into the capability certificate revocation list) as well as to provide safety redundancy (in the event of the failure of a verification server that a host platform depends on), a host platform can request capability certificates for the same template from several different verification servers. It can then select to alternate between these verification servers when submitting certificates in response to requests from mobile agents that are about to migrate to it. Copies of execution certificates retained at the host platform from different verification servers can serve as evidence in helping to clarify the possible situation where a malicious verification server attempts to malign the host platform.
Advantages achieved over original technique
The modification of the original execution tracing protocol to the form that is being utilized in the framework lends several important advantages :
1. Execution tracing can now be performed by any verification server on a host platform once a mobile agent on that platform completes executing. In t.he origined protocol, execution tracing was only possible at the agent owner's site after the mobile agent had completed a tour of its itinerary. In addition, tracing is now compulsory for each host platform and not an optional activity triggered by a suspicious agent owner, as is the case with the original protocol. This allows the detection of malicious tampering as soon as it occurs at any point on the agent's itinerary.
2. Trace logs no longer need be retained at the host platform; maintenance of all tracing evidence is delegated to the verification server. This information will be encapsulated in the form of capability and execution certificates and will be more succinct] being a summary of the results of a trace rather them a log of the entire trace itself.
3.
By offios~llng the verification activity to another entity (the verification server), the agent owner is no longer inflicted with tedious trace checking activities that may become insurmountable when the number of mobile agents launched from it increases or the communication between distant host platforms axe v0areli-able. This increases the scalability of the protocol.
RELATED WORK
The integration of a mobile agent system within some form of certificate infrastructure has been the subject of recent work on mobile agent security. In his work on privilege management for mobile agents, Jansen [13] introduces attribute certificates as a flexible manner to express the privileges associated with a mobile agent. Attribute certificates are combined with a mechanism that permits the instantiation of a policy engine in order to provide a framework that can be tailored to meet the security policy of individual applications. Hu [II] in turn proposes several, mechanisms for building up an agent-oriented PKI from SPKI/SDSI [5] and X,509 certificate standards. This include the use of trust delegation mechanisms such as chain-ruled, threshold and conditional delegation. Certificates are employed in these approaches as a means to address the first aspect of mobile agent security: host security. In general, a certificate is dispatched along with the mobile agent and is evaluated by the receiving host platform to determine the authorization rights to various system resources that should be accorded to the agent.
Our work is the first to address the use of certificates within a PKI to tackle the alternative aspect of mobile agent security: code security. This is achieved primarily through the use of capability certificates that are submitted by a potential host platform to a mobile agent to indicate the safety of its execution environment for the agent concerned. Execution certificates are also issued at the end of a successful trace verification to indicate to the next platform in the agent's itinerary that a valid execution of the agent was achieved on the current platform.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed a security fTamework for mobile agents that extends the execution tracing technique to make it appropriate for large scale environments. The key entity in this framework is the verification server that undertakes the execution tracing activity on behalf of the agent owner platform and issues capability and execution certificates (in a manner analogous to a CA) to the carlotto host platforms in the system. Capability certificates are produced to verify the safety (or otherwise) of the execution environments of various host platforms, while execution certificates are used to provide an indication of the validity of agent execution on a particular host platform.
There remains much work that needs to be done in extending the conceptual framework that we have just described. In particular, a practical implementation of execution tracing has yet to be realized in any major mobile agent system. The interactions between the different entities in the framework needs to be formalized so that specific security properties can be identified and maintained, ff possible. Investigation needs to be carried out with regards to the other types of security techniques that can be employed in conjunction with execution tracing and the manner in which they can be integrated into the framework. The detailed format of the capability and execution certificates needs to be examined to see how they might be successfully integrated into the certificate management activities of a standard PKI. Last but not least, the implications of issuing and employing certificates in the manner described here needs to be investigated in greater detail to determine its viability Eor actual application.
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